1. My Formulation
2. Philosophers Frame the Hard Problem
2.1 Kastrup
- “It is impossible to conceive—even in principle—of how or why any particular structural or functional arrangement of physical elements would constitute or generate experience (Rosenberg 2004: 13-30, Strawson et al. 2006: 2-30). This is a well-known problem in neuroscience and philosophy of mind, often referred to as the ‘hard problem of consciousness.’ The qualities of experience are irreducible to the observable parameters of physical arrangements—whatever the arrangement is—in the sense that it is impossible to deduce those qualities—even in principle—from these parameters (Chalmers 2003). It remains conceivable that physical arrangements could modulate experience, without constituting or generating it, if one postulates some form of dualism.” Kastrup, Bernardo. The Idea of the World (p. 64).
My response: impossible?!? I can conceive it! If the electromagnetic field is intrinsically bipolar due to c linking any two points between which light moves, then it must “be like” something to be an electromagnetic field. Further, there must be differences between what it is like to have this voltage or that voltage, by the non-identity of discernibles. Therefore there must be “some way” it is to be this voltage and “some way” it is like to be that voltage, and therefore you are simply forced to have an “alphabet” of ways it is like to be based on these differences. I think he is really leaving out Russellian monism.
neuroself 