Consciousness Readings

1. Philosophy of Mind

1.1 Free Resources & Approach to Staying Current

Stanford Online Encylopedia of Philosophy: The best free resource for philosophy on the web. Excellent authors, kept current. Always review the Bibliography to look for good citations.

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: I don’t like it *quite* as much as Stanford’s, but it often has something useful and different to add, so for any given subject it’s worth reviewing. For example there is nothing on the Hard Problem per se on Stanford, but here’s the IEP on the Hard Problem

Notre Dame Online Philosophical Review: As a way of staying current with philosophy books published in the past 6-12 months, with excellent reviews by respected philosophers, all for *free*, NDPR can’t be beat.

PhilPapers (started by David Chalmers) is a great resource for seeing who’s written what lately. It’s kind of one-stop shopping so you don’t have to go to each individual website. Key journals to keep tabs on, ranked by leiter, the brains blog, Mark Colyvan, and Scimago. You can click through to the article on the original website:

  1. Nous
  2. Philosophical Review
  3. Mind
  4. Journal of Philosophy
  5. Mind and Language
  6. Thinking and Reasoning
  7. Philosophy Compass
  8. Philosophical Quarterly
  9. Synthese
  10. Erkenntnis
  11. Minds and Machines
  12. Journal of Consciousness Studies
  13. Analysis
  14. Mind and Matter
  15. Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  16. Consciousness and Cognition
  17. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science
  18. Cognition
  19. Philosophy and Mind Sciences (started 6/2020)

Early Modern Texts: free books!

Online courses in philosophy through openculture

David Chalmers’s website

Blogs: reddit philosophy, international philosophy olympiad, Nick Byrd, new philosopher, the philosopher’s magazine, philosophy now, ashishdalela, Brian Weatherson, The Brains Blog; Mark Colyvan, dailynous, aeon, leiterreports, informationphilosopher, bernardokastrup, indianphilosophyblog, aphilosopherstake, warburton’s philosopher’s take, thesplinteredmind, whatisitliketobeaphilosopher, Philosophy Talk (Stanford), (lists of blogs: michigan’s list, chalmers’s list)

1.2 Collections in Philosophy of Mind

There are a few volumes of collected readings that allow you to read many, many key papers in one volume. These are great places to start.

Original essays
 Amazon link.
Famous papers
Amazon link
Hard problem
Amazon link
Russellian monism
Amazon link
classics
Amazon link

Anthology
Amazon link

1.2 Key Individual papers in Philosophy of Mind

Nagel, Thomas What is it like to be a bat? One of the most famous papers in all of philosophy of mind. Put the now famous saying “what is it like?” on the map.

1.3 Other Individual Papers, not quite as fundamental

Block, Ned, et al., eds., The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). [Contains many classic papers on consciousness, though now showing its age a bit.]

Cassam, Quassim, ed., Self-Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). [On knowledge of one’s own mind: see the introduction to this collection]

Chalmers, David, ed., Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). [This contains many useful readings for a number of areas of the paper. Referred to below as Chalmers]

Crane, Tim, The Mechanical Mind. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003; 3rd ed. 2016), ch. 6 ‘Consciousness and the mechanical mind’ (ch. 18 in 3rd ed.). Also available online via: https://idiscover.lib.cam.ac.uk/permalink/f/1ii55o6/44CAM_ALMA51529265330003606.

Crane, Tim, Elements of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), ch. 1 ‘Mind’.

Davies, Martin, and Tony Stone, eds., Folk Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). [On other minds: see the introduction to this collection]

Dretske, Fred (2002) “A Recipe for Thought,” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 491-499

Kenny, Anthony, Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge, 1963; reprinted with a new preface in 2003).

Gertler, Brie, and Larry Shapiro, eds., Arguing About the Mind (London: Routledge, 2007). [A more unusual anthology, with some good pieces that are not found in the normal textbooks]

McLaughlin, Brian, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). PDF of first chapter (introduction)

Frege, Gottlob, ‘Thoughts’, in his Collected Papers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 351-72. Reprinted in P.F. Strawson, ed., Philosophical Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). Also in P. Yourgrau, ed., Demonstratives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

Kaplan, David, ‘Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals’, in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 481-563. Also available

Mellor, D.H., ‘I and Now’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 89 (1989): 79-94.

Perry, John, ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, Noûs, 13, no. 1 (1979): 3-21.

Boër, Stephen E., and W.G. Lycan, ‘Who, Me?’ Philosophical Review, 89, no. 3 (1980): 427-66.

Evans, Gareth, ‘Self-Identification’, in Q. Cassam, ed., Self-Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

Lewis, David, ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se‘, Philosophical Review, 88, no. 4 (1979): 513-43.

Nagel, Thomas, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986),

Reichenbach, Hans, Elements of Symbolic Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1948),

Burge, Tyler, ‘Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96 (1996): 91-116. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4107077

Smithies, Declan, and Daniel Stoljar, eds., Introspection and Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

Heal, Jane, ‘On ‘First Person Authority”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 102 (2001): 1-19.

Moran, Richard,Authority and Estrangement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

Schwitzgebel, Eric, ‘The Unreliability of Naive Introspection’, Philosophical Review, 117 (2008): 245-28-73. http://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-037

Block, Ned, ‘On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, no. 2 (1995): 227-47

Dennett, Daniel, ‘Towards a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness’, in Brainstorms (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), pp. 149-73.

Phillips, Ian, ‘Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn’t Show’, Mind & Language, 26 (2011): 381-411

Rosenthal, David, ‘Two Concepts of Consciousness’, Philosophical Studies, 49, no. 3 (1986): 329-59

Hill, Christopher, Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

Shoemaker, Sydney, ‘Qualia and Consciousness’, Mind, 100, no. 4 (1994): 507-24.

Siewert, Charles, The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton University Press, 1998

Akins, Kathleen, ‘What Is It Like to Be Boring and Myopic?’ in B. Dahlbom, ed., Dennett and His Critics. 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 124-60

Chalmers, David, The Conscious Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)

Jackson, Frank, ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly, 32, no. 127 (1982): 127-36

*Lewis, David, ‘What Experience Teaches’, in W.G. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 499-519. Also in Block and Chalmers, above.

*Nagel, Thomas, ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’ The Philosophical Review, 83, no. 4 (1974): 435-50. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2183914. Reprinted in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp.165-80. Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107341050.014.

Alter, Torin, and Sven Walter, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001.

Johnston, Mark, ‘Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75, no. 2 (2007): 233-68. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40041108.

Ludlow, Peter, ed., There’s Something About Mary (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). [A collection of essays on Jackson’s ‘knowledge argument’. See the essays by Stoljar, Hellie and Robinson]

Papineau, David, Thinking About Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/0199243824.001.0001.

Intentional theories of consciousness

Intentionalist theories of consciousness argue that what it is for a mental state to be phenomenally conscious just is for it to have a particular type of content. There are broadly, two types of intentionalist theories: first-order and higher-order.

First order representationalist theories argue that the phenomenal character of an experience is identical with its representational content.

*Block, Ned, ‘Inverted Earth’, Philosophical Perspectives, 4 (1990): 53-79. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214187. Reprinted in Block, above.

*Dretske, Fred, Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), chs. 3 & 4.

*Harman, Gilbert, ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, Philosophical Perspectives, 4 (1990): 31-52. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214186. Reprinted in his Reasoning, Meaning and Mind (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), pp. 244-61. Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/0198238029.003.0015. Also reprinted in Block, above.

*Kind, Amy, ‘Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness’, Philosophy Compass, 5, no. 10 (2010): 902-13. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00328.x.

*Tye, Michael, Ten Problems of Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), chs. 1-5.

Byrne, A., ‘Intentionalism Defended’, Philosophical Review, 110, no. 2 (2001): 199-240. https://doi.org/10.2307/2693675.

Crane, Tim, ‘Intentionalism’, in McLaughlin, above, pp. 474-93. Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0029.

Dennett, Daniel, ‘Quining Qualia’, in A.J. Marcel and E. Bisiach, eds., Consciousness in Contemporary Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 42-77. Reprinted in W.G. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), and in Block, above. Also available on Moodle.

Higher-order internationalist theories argue that phenomenal consciousness requires inner awareness. To be conscious a mental state must be the object of another mental state.

*Dretske, Fred, ‘Conscious Experience’, Mind, 1 (1993): 263-83. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253868. Reprinted in Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings (2002): 422-434.

*Rosenthal, David M., ‘The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality’, Philosophical Issues, 1, no. 406 (1991): 15-36. https://doi.org/10.2307/1522921.

Carruthers, Peter, Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487491.

Lycan, William G., Consciousness and Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), ch. 2 ‘Conscious awareness as internal monitoring’.

Rosenthal, David M., ‘Explaining Consciousness’, in D.J. Chalmers, ed., Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 406-21.

Unity of consciousness

What characterises the unity of consciousness? What do cases where such unity seems to break down tell us about the mind?

*Hume, David, Treatise of Human Nature Book 1, part iv, sect. 6. Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198245872.book.1.

Bayne, Tim, and David Chalmers, ‘What Is the Unity of Consciousness?’ in A. Cleeremans, ed., The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, Dissociation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 23-58. Also available online on Chalmers’s website at: http://consc.net/papers/unity.html.

Broad, C.D., The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1925), ch. 13 ‘The Unity of the Mind’.

Hill, Christopher S., Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), ch. 10 ‘Unity of Consciousness, Other minds, and Phenomenal Space’ (pp. 228-44). Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173827.011.

Nagel, Thomas, ‘Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness’, Synthese, 22, no. 3/4 (1971): 396-413. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20114764. Reprinted in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107341050.013.

Tye, Michael, ‘The Problem of Common Sensibles’, Erkenntnis, 66, no. 1/2 (2007): 287-303. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27667893

Intentionality and Mental Representation

The nature of intentionality

What is intentionality?

Anscombe, G.E.M., ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature’, in R.J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy. 2nd Series (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965). Reprinted in her Philosophical Papers. Vol.2: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), pp. 3-20. Also available on Moodle.

Brentano, Franz, ‘The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena’, in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 77-100. Also available on Moodle. [Originally published in 1874 by Duncker and Humblot, Leipzig as Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt]

Crane, Tim, Elements of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), ch. 1 ‘Mind’. Also available on Moodle.

Dennett, Daniel, Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), chs. 1 & 2.

Fodor, Jerry, ‘Propositional Attitudes’, The Monist, 61 (1978): 501-24. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist197861444. Reprinted in his Representations (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), pp. 177-203.

Forbes, Graeme, Attitude Problems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chs. 3 & 4. Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199274949.001.0001

Frege, Gottlob, ‘The Thought: A Logical Inquiry’, Mind, 65, no. 259 (1956): 289-311. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251513

Prior, A.N., Objects of Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), Part 2 ‘What we think about’. Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243540.001.0001.

Searle, John, Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), ch. 1 ‘The nature of intentional states’. Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173452.002.

Intentional objects

*McGinn, Colin, Logical Properties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 2 ‘Existence’. Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/0199241813.003.0002.

*Quine, W.V.O., ‘On What There Is’, Review of Metaphysics, 2, no. 5 (1948): 21-38. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20123117. Reprinted in his From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953; 2nd rev. ed. 1961), pp. 1-19.

Cartwright, Richard, ‘Negative Existentials’, The Journal of Philosophy, 57, no. 20/21 (1960): 629-39. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2023455

Chisholm, Roderick, ‘Intentional Inexistence’, in D. Rosenthal, ed., The Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 297-304. Also on Moodle.

Crane, Tim, ‘What Is the Problem of Non-Existence?’ Philosophia, 40, no. 3 (2012): 417-34. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9354-1. Also available online at: http://www.timcrane.com/uploads/2/5/2/4/25243881/problem_of_non-existence.pdf.

Donnellan, Keith, ‘Speaking of Nothing’, Philosophical Review, 83, no. 1 (1974): 3-31. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183871

Kripke, Saul, Reference and Existence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199928385.001.0001.

Priest, Graham, Towards Non-Being (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), chs. 3-5. Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/0199262543.001.0001.

Quine, W.V.O., ‘Existence and Quantification’, in his Ontological Relativity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 91-113. Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.7312/quin92204-005.

Russell, Bertrand, ‘On Denoting’, Mind, 14, no. 456 (1905): 479-93. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3840617. Reprinted in his Logic and Knowledge (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958).

Sainsbury, R.M., Reference without Referents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/0199241805.001.0001.

Salmon, Nathan, ‘Existence’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1 (1987): 49-108. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214143

Van Inwagen, Peter, ‘McGinn on Existence’, Philosophical Quarterly, 58, no. 230 (2008): 36-58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40468236

Reductive theories of content

Can we give a naturalistic account of representational content?

*Cummins, Robert, Meaning and Mental Representation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988). [The whole book is highly recommended, but chapters 6-8 are particularly useful here]

*Dennett, Daniel, ‘Intentional Systems’, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, no. 4 (1971): 87-106. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025382. Reprinted in his Brainstorms (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), pp. 3-22.

*Field, Hartry, ‘Mental Representation’, Erkenntnis, 13, no. 1 (1978): 9-61. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20010621. Reprinted in N. Block, ed., Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 2 (London: Methuen, 1981), pp. 78-114. Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674594722.c7. Also reprinted in S. Stich and T. Warfield, eds., Mental Representation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

*Loewer, Barry, and Georges Rey, eds., Meaning in Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). [Essays by Boghossian and Antony & Levine]

*Millikan, Ruth Garrett, ‘Biosemantics’, The Journal of Philosophy, 86, no. 6 (1989): 281-97. https://doi.org/10.2307/2027123. Reprinted in S. Stich and T. Warfield, eds., Mental Representation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

Block, Ned, ‘Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology’, Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10 (1987): 615-78. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00558.x. Reprinted in S. Stich and T. Warfield, eds., Mental Representation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 81-141.

Crane, Tim, The Mechanical Mind. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1995; 2nd ed. 2003; 3rd ed. 2016), ch. 5 (ch. 9 in 3rd ed.) ‘Explaining mental representation’. Also available online at: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cam/reader.action?docID=172830&ppg=182 (2nd ed.) and via: https://idiscover.lib.cam.ac.uk/permalink/f/1ii55o6/44CAM_ALMA51529265330003606 (3rd ed.).

Dretske, Fred, Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), chs. 3-5.

Fodor, Jerry, Psychosemantics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), ch. 4 ‘Meaning and the world order’.

Fodor, Jerry, A Theory of Content and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), chs. 3 & 4.

Harman, Gilbert, ‘Conceptual Role Semantics’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23, no. 2 (1982): 242-56. http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1093883628. Reprinted in E. Lepore, et al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0014.

Millikan, Ruth Garrett, ‘Thoughts without Laws: Cognitive Science with Content’, Philosophical Review, 95, no. 1 (1986): 47-80. https://doi.org/10.2307/2185132. Reprinted in her White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 51-82.

Stalnaker, Robert, Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), chs. 1 & 2.

Stampe, Dennis, ‘Towards a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation’, Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2 (1989): 42-63. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1977.tb00027.x.

Sterelny, Kim, The Representational Theory of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), ch. 6 ‘Explaining content’.

Externalism and internalism

Does the content of our mental states depend on our relationship to the external environment?

*Burge, Tyler, ‘Individualism and the Mental’, Studies in Metaphysics, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4 (1979): 73-121. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1979.tb00374.x. Reprinted in D. Rosenthal, ed., Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

*Farkas, Katalin, ‘What Is Externalism?’ Philosophical Studies, 112, no. 3 (2003): 187-208. http://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023002625641

*Fodor, Jerry, ‘Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980): 63-73. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00001771. Reprinted in his Representations (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), pp. 225-53. Also reprinted in D. Rosenthal, ed., Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

*Fodor, Jerry, Psychosemantics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), ch. 2 ‘Individualism and supervenience’. Also available on Moodle.

*Putnam, Hilary, ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning”, in his Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2, Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625251.014. Reprinted in K. Gunderson, (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), pp. 131-93.

Blackburn, Simon, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), ch. 9 ‘Reference’.

Burge, Tyler, ‘Other Bodies’, in A. Woodfield, ed., Thought and Object (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 97-120.

Burge, Tyler, ‘Two Thought Experiments Reviewed’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23, no. 3 (1982): 284-93. http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1093870087.

Evans, Gareth, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), ch. 6 ‘Demonstrative identification’.

McDowell, John, ‘Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space’, in P. Pettit and J. McDowell, eds., Subject, Thought and Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 137-68.

McKinsey, Michael, ‘Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access’, Analysis, 51, no. 1 (1991): 9-16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328625

Noonan, Harold, ‘Russellian Thoughts and Methodological Solipsism’, in J. Butterfield, ed., Language, Mind and Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 67-90.

Segal, Gabriel, A Slim Book About Narrow Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).

Sterelny, Kim, The Representational Theory of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), ch. 5 ‘Individualism’.

Mental Faculties

Intention and the will

Do we have a distinct faculty of the will? What are intentions and what role do they play in the phenomena of addiction and weakness of will?

*Bratman, Michael, ‘Two Faces of Intention’, Philosophical Review, 93, no. 3 (1984): 375-405. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184542

*Broome, John, ‘Are Intentions Reasons’, in C. Morris and A. Ripstein, eds., Practical Rationality and Preference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 98-120. Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570803.006.

*Davidson, Donald, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984; 2nd ed. 2001), ch. 2 ‘How is weakness of the will possible?’ Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/0199246270.003.0002 (2nd ed.).

*Holton, Richard, ‘How Is Strength of Will Possible?’ in S. Stroud and C. Tappolet, eds., Weakness of the Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 39-67. Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199257361.003.0003.

*Holton, Richard, ‘Intention and Weakness of Will’, The Journal of Philosophy, 96, no. 5 (1999): 241-62. https://doi.org/10.2307/2564667

*Kavka, Gregory, ‘The Toxin Puzzle’, Analysis, 43, no. 1 (1983): 33-36. https://doi.org/10.2307/3327802

Ainslie, George, ‘A Selectionist Model of the Ego: Implications for Self-Control’, in N. Sebanz and W. Prinz, eds., Disorders of Volition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), pp. 119-50. Also available online at: http://picoeconomics.org/Articles/MunichRepr.pdf.

Anscombe, G.E.M., Intention. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963; reprinted Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

Baumeister, Roy, et al., ‘Ego-Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74 (1998): 1252-65. http://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252

Gollwitzer, Peter, and Veronika Brandstätter, ‘Implementation Intentions and Effective Goal Pursuit’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73 (1997): 186-99. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.73.1.186.

Holton, Richard, and Kent Berridge, ‘Addiction between Compulsion and Choice’, in N. Levy, ed., Addiction and Self-Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 239-68. Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199862580.003.0012.

Robinson, Terry, and Kent Berridge, ‘Addiction’, Annual Review of Psychology, 54 (2003): 25-53. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145237

Imagination

Is there a special faculty of imagination? Does imagination pose a challenge to traditional belief-desire psychology? What is the role of “images” in imagination?

Currie, Gregory, and Ian Ravenscroft, Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238089.001.0001. [Particularly chs. 1-6]

Doggett, Tyler, and Andy Egan, ‘Wanting Things You Don’t Want’, Imprints, 7, no. 9 (2007): 1-17. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0007.009

Kind, Amy, ‘The Heterogeneity of the Imagination’, Erkenntnis, 78, no. 1 (2013): 141-59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23356755

Kind, Amy, ‘Putting the Image Back in Imagination’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, no. 1 (2001): 85-109. https://doi.org/10.2307/2653590

Kind, Amy, ‘The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89, no. 3 (2011): 421-39. http://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2010.503763

Langland-Hassan, Peter, ‘ Imaginative Attitudes’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 950, no. 3 (2014): 664-86. http://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12115.

Langland-Hassan, Peter, ‘Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single Attitude Theory’, Philosophical Studies, 159, no. 2 (2012): 155-79. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23262283.

Langland-Hassan, Peter, ‘What It Is to Pretend’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95, no. 3 (2014): 397-420. http://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12037.

Liao, Shen-Yi, and Tyler Doggett, ‘The Imagination Box’, The Journal of Philosophy, 111, no. 5 (2014): 259-75. http://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2014111521.

Nichols, Shaun, and Stephen Stich, ‘A Cognitive Theory of Pretense’, Cognition, 74, no. 2 (2005): 115-47. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(99)00070-0.

Nichols, Shaun, and Stephen Stich, Mindreading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), ch. 2 ‘A cognitive theory of pretence’. Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/0198236107.003.0002.

Schellenberg, Susanna, ‘Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion’, The Journal of Philosophy, 110, no. 9 (2013): 497-517. http://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2013110914.

Tye, Michael, The Imagery Debate (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).

Walton, Kendall, ‘Fearing Fictions’, The Journal of Philosophy, 75, no. 1 (1978): 5-27. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025831

Can we gain knowledge through imagination? Or can we only imagine what we know?

Gendler, Tamar Szabó, ‘Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific Thought Experiment’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49, no. 3 (1998): 397-424. http://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/49.3.397.

Kind, Amy, and Peter Kung, eds., Knowledge through Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716808.001.0001. [Particularly essays by Langland-Hassan, Kind, Spaulding, Williamson]

Mind-reading

How do we know about the mental states of others’? According to theory theorists, we employ a theory of mind. According to simulation theorists, we imaginatively project ourselves into others’ situation.

*Carruthers, Peter, and Peter Smith, eds., Theories of Theories of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511597985. [Essays by Gordon, Carruthers and Heal]

*Davies, Martin, and Tony Stone, eds., Folk Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), Introduction and essays 1-3 and 5. [Heal’s essay is also in J. Butterfield, ed., Language, Mind and Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)]

*Davies, Martin, and Tony Stone, ‘Mental Simulation, Tacit Theory, and the Threat of Collapse’, Philosophical Topics, 29, no. 1/2 (2001): 127-73. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43154362.

*Lewis, David, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identification’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50, no. 3 (1972): 249-58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048407212341301

Gordon, Robert, ‘Simulation without Introspection or Inference from Me to You’, in M. Davies and T. Stone, eds., Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 53-67.

Heal, Jane, ‘Understanding Other Minds from the Inside’, in A. O’Hear, ed., Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 83-99. Also available on Moodle.

Stich, Stephen, and Shaun Nichols, ‘Second Thoughts on Simulation’, in M. Davies and T. Stone, eds., Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 86-108.

Do we have a distinct capacity for empathy?

*Coplan, Amy, and Peter Goldie, eds., Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives Vol. 16 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Introduction, and chs. by Coplan, Goldman, and Goldie. Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539956.001.0001.

De Vignemont, Frederique, and Tania Singer, ‘The Empathic Brain: How, When and Why?’ Trends in Cognitive Science, 10, no. 10 (2006): 435-41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.08.008

Renee Descartes, Second Meditation: The Nature of the Human Mind and How It Is Better Known Than the Body,” from
Meditations on First Philosophy, reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 10-13.
Jaegwon Kim, Chapter 3: Mind as Immaterial Substance, Philosophy of Mind (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2011), 31-60.
Gilbert Ryle, “Descartes’ Myth,” from The Concept of Mind, reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 32-38.
Jaegwon Kim, Chapter 3: Mind as Behavior, Philosophy of Mind (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2011), 61-90.
Hilary Putnam, “Brains and Behavior,” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 45-54.
U. T. Place, Is Consciousness a Brain Process,” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 55-60.
J.J.C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press), 60-68.
Jaegwon Kim, Chapter 4: Mind as Brain, Philosophy of Mind (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2011), 91-128.
Hilary Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States,” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 73-79.
David Armstrong, “The Causal Theory of the Mind,” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 80-87.
William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale, “Multiple Realizability Revisted: Linking Cognitive and Neural States,” Philosophy of
Science 66(2), 1999: 175-207.
Eric R. Kandel, In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of the Mind (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006).
Mark Mayford and Eric R. Kandel, “Genetic Approaches to Memory Storage,” Trends in Genetics, 15(11), 1999: 463-470.
Ned Block, “Concepts of Consciousness,” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 206-218.
Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 119-226.
Kathleen Akins, “A Bat without Qualities,” in ed. Martin Davies and Glyn W. Humphreys, Consciousness: Psychological and
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1993), 345-358.
Howard C. Hughes, Sensory Exotica: A World beyond Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
Kathleen Akins, “What It Is Like to be Boring and Myopic,” in B. Dahlbom, Dennett and His Critics (Malden, MA: Blackwell,
1993)
Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 273-280.
Daniel C. Dennett, “Quining Qualia,” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 226-246.
David Lewis, “What Experience Teaches,” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 281-294.
David J. Chalmers, “Two Concepts of Mind,” Chapter 1, The Consciousness Mind ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
Roderick M. Chisolm, “Intentional Inexistence,” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and
Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 484-491.

Ruth Garrett Millikan, “Biosemantics,” reprinted in ed. David Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 500-509.


Kathleen Akins, “Of Sensory Systems and the ‘Aboutness’ of Mental States,” The Journal of Philosophy 93(7), 1996: 337-372.